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DRED SCOTT: TIERED CITIZENSHIP AND TIERED PERSONHOOD 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Dred Scott v. Sandford' is one of the most troubling opinions ever is-
sued by the United States Supreme Court.2 Though its deficiencies are 
legion, the particular problem this brief essay focuses on is the opinion's 
acceptance and perpetuation of the notion that America affords multiple 
tiers of citizenship and multiple tiers of personhood. The tiered citizenship 
that Dred Scott accepted suggests that denying certain citizenship rights to 
specific groups of citizens is acceptable. Similarly, the tiered personhood 
that Dred Scott allowed suggests that rights ostensibly owed to all people 
by virtue of their personhood are not owed to certain groups of people. 
Rather than attempt to justify the differential treatment between groups of 
citizens and between groups of people, the Dred Scott opinion simply noted 
the differential treatment and accepted it. For these reasons alone, Chief 
Justice Taney's majority opinion deserves the opprobrium that has been 
heaped upon it. 3 
The twin ills of tiered citizenship and tiered personhood were largely 
eliminated, in theory and eventually in practice, by the Reconstruction 
Amendments-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution. Through their language and subsequent interpreta-
tion, those amendments introduced a formal equality that created a single 
* The author extends a special thank you to Dr. Spencer Crew, Director, National Underground 
Railroad Freedom Center, who commented on this paper at the Dred Scott Symposium at the University 
of Texas School of Law and to all of the participants at the symposium who provided comments on this 
paper. In addition I thank my family for their support and the University of Richmond Law School for 
the financial support of this project. 
I. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
2. It was also a catalyst in causing untold pain. See PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED ScOTT v. 
SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 2 (1997) ("It would be an exaggeration to say that the 
Dred Scott decision caused the Civil War. But it certainly pushed the nation far closer to that war."). 
3. References to Dred Scott or the Dred Scott opinion are to Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's 
opinion. Though great debate remains regarding the issues on which Taney's opinion should be deemed 
authoritative, Taney's opinion has become the Dred Scott opinion such that the ideas found in it can be 
called the ideas of the Dred Scott Court. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 337 (1978) ("And yet the Taney opinion is, for all 
practical purposes, the Dred Scott decision and therefore a historical document of prime importance."). 
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tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood by requiring that citizen-
ship rights be provided equally to citizens and rights of personhood be pro-
vided to all people under U.S. jurisdiction. Certainly, under certain 
conditions, some citizens may be stripped of citizenship rights and some 
persons may be denied certain rights of life, liberty, or property. When a 
denial of rights is properly justified, the denial does no violence to the no-
tion of a single tier of citizenship or a single tier of personhood. Con-
versely, when there is no proper justification for stripping such rights, such 
treatment may create tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood. 
Part I of this brief essay discusses Dred Scott and the Court's accep-
tance of tiered citizenship and tiered personhood. Part II discusses the Re-
construction Amendments as a response to tiered citizenship and tiered 
personhood. Part III notes two issues-felon disfranchisement and the 
treatment of detainees in the War on Terror-that help illuminate tiered 
citizenship and tiered personhood and help us evaluate the conditions under 
which citizenship and personhood rights may be restricted without creating 
tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood.4 
I. DRED SCOTT'S TAXONOMY OF CITIZENSHIP AND PERSONHOOD 
Though the facts of Dred Scott v. Sandford are known to most, its 
most basic facts bear repeating. In the case, plaintiff Dred Scott claimed 
that he became a free man during his travels with his master through Illi-
nois, a free state, and Fort Snelling in the Wisconsin territory, near modem-
day St. Paul, Minnesota, where slavery had been banned by the Missouri 
Compromise.s If Scott were a free man, neither he nor his family, whose 
cases had been consolidated with his, could be held in servitude. However, 
intertwined with the issue of Scott's freedom was whether Scott could sue 
in federal court. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney, decided, in ruling against Scott, that Scott was not and 
could not be a citizen of Missouri for the purposes of the diversity jurisdic-
tion that was necessary to allow the federal courts to hear Scott's case.6 
4. Of course, this brief essay is meant merely to raise issues rather than resolve them and is not 
intended to be a full treatment of any of the issues raised herein. For a fuller treatment of some of the 
issues raised, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1397 (2002) [hereinafter Chambers, Co/orblindness]; Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Retooling 
the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 611 
(2004) [hereinafter Chambers, Retooling]. 
5. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 431-32; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 244; 
FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
6. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454 ("[T]he plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, 
in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United 
States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it."). In addition, 
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Though that ruling arguably resolved the case, Taney analyzed Scott's 
substantive claim to freedom and rejected it, leaving Scott and his family 
enslaved.7 
The Court's ruling, that Scott was not a citizen, was not particularly 
shocking. However, the language Chief Justice Taney used to discuss 
Scott's citizenship and personhood, or lack thereof, is breathtaking. Taney 
indicated not only that Scott was not a citizen, but also declared that under 
no circumstances could Scott or any black person-whether born free, 
formerly enslaved, or then still enslaved-be a citizen of the United States 
under the Constitution and laws as they then stood.8 Taney not only noted 
that Scott was not a citizen of the United States, but that even if Scott had 
been a free black person, he might not have been entitled to the rights that 
other non-U.S. citizen residents in the United States could exercise.9 The 
structure of Taney's argument, with its clear delineations that treated some 
groups of citizens differently than other groups of citizens and that treated 
some groups of persons differently than other groups of persons, recog-
nized and tacitly endorsed tiered citizenship and tiered personhood. 
A. Citizenship 
Before deciding whether Dred Scott was a citizen of a state and of the 
United States, Chief Justice Taney had to determine what a citizen is. The 
Dred Scott Court's vision of who was a citizen was simple. Citizens were 
members of the sovereign people for whom the Republic was founded and 
by whom the Republic was run (through their representatives).lO The re-
the Court ruled the Missouri Compromise invalid to the extent that it banned slavery in the Upper 
Louisiana territory, though that issue is not a core concern of this essay. See id. at 432-52. 
7. See id. at 452 ("[T]he act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning 
property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not 
warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his 
family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the 
owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident."). 
8. See id. at 404 ("We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to 
be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States."). 
9. See id. at 403-04 (noting that Indians retained the possibility of becoming citizens while black 
persons did not). 
10. See id. at 404 ("The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, 
and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican 
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their 
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this 
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty."). 
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mainder of Taney's discussion of Dred Scott's claims of citizenship flowed 
from this understanding of citizenship.'' 
The citizens of the several states at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution became citizens of the United States and no one else.l2 Those 
descended from that group of people also became citizens of the United 
States, as it was for the posterity of the citizens of the several states that the 
states created the United States.t3 Those not descended from the original 
citizens of the United States had to become citizens of the United States 
through other birthright means or through naturalization controlled by the 
federal govemment.14 Upon ratification of the Constitution, the right to 
create U.S. citizens was given solely to the federal govemment.15 States 
retained the right to create state citizens who could exercise state citizen-
ship rights.16 However, states lost the ability to create state citizens who 
would automatically become U.S. citizens and could exercise the rights of 
U.S. citizenship, including the right to enjoy the rights and immunities of 
the citizens of other states when traveling in those other states.17 
Given its vision of citizen creation, the Dred Scott Court had to exam-
ine how slaves and their descendants were regarded at the time the United 
States was created to determine if any had been citizens or had been capa-
II. Determining what citizenship entails, and even asserting what citizenship is, is far more 
difficult than Chief Justice Taney suggested. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 64--66 (discussing 
difficulties in defining and explaining what citizenship entailed in the context of free black persons 
before Dred Scott). 
12. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 406 ("It is true, every person, and every class and de-
scription of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in 
the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by 
them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else."). 
13. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that the Constitution was formed for the benefit of the people 
of the United States and their posterity). 
14. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 406 (limiting rights of U.S. citizenship "to embrace those 
only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright 
or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on 
which it was founded"). 
15. See id. at 418 ("The Constitution upon its adoption obviously took from the States all power 
by any subsequent legislation to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the United States any 
one, no matter where he was born, or what might be his character or condition; and it gave to Congress 
the power to confer this character upon those only who were born outside of the dominions of the 
United States. And no law of a State, therefore, passed since the Constitution was adopted, can give any 
right of citizenship outside of its own territory."). 
16. See id. at 405-06 (noting that a State can grant a person state citizenship with the result that 
"so far as the State alone was concerned, [the person] would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a 
citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State 
attached to that character"). 
17. See id. at 405 ("Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by natural-
izing an alien invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal 
Government .... "); see also JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC 215-16 (2002) (discussing 
the implications of not allowing free black persons to exercise the rights and immunities of citizens of 
the U.S.). 
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ble of becoming citizens at that time. If slaves or former slaves were eligi-
ble for citizenship at the Founding, Scott may have had a legitimate claim 
that if he had become free, he had become a citizen of a state and of the 
United States at the moment of his freedom. However, if slaves and former 
slaves were not citizens-were not part of the sovereign people who 
formed the people of the United States when the Constitution was rati-
fied-then even if Scott had become free during his travels, he could not be 
treated as a citizen of any state or as a citizen of the United States for the 
purpose of suing under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court. Ulti-
mately, Chief Justice Taney found that the whole Negro race had been so 
poorly regarded at the time of the ratification of the Constitution that 
none-free or slave--could have been citizens of the United States at that 
time. 
According to Taney, black persons simply had not been part of the 
polity when the nation was founded and would not become so absent con-
gressional action or constitutional amendment.IS Taney's claim that black 
persons had not been a part of the polity in the late 1700s meant that black 
persons could not be a part of the polity in the mid-1850s either. Basing his 
analysis of black citizenship at the Founding on race and ancestry rather 
than status, Taney merged race and slavery, asserting that all black persons 
had come to America as slaves.t9 Consequently, all black people, whether 
free or slave, were descendants of slaves and were in the same class of 
people, for citizenship purposes, as slaves, and thus were unable to be or 
become citizens of the United States.2o 
The impossibility of black citizenship fit with Taney's view on how 
citizens were made, i.e., by being descended from the group of state citi-
18. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407 ("In the opinion of the court, the legislation and 
histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the 
class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free 
or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words 
used in that memorable instrument."). Justice Curtis, in dissent, argued that Taney was palpably wrong. 
See id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New 
Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those 
States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors, on 
equal terms with other citizens."). 
19. See id. at 411 (opinion of the Court) ("No one of that race had ever migrated to the United 
States voluntarily; all of them had been brought here as articles of merchandise."). 
20. See id. at 403 ("It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose 
ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. 
The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when 
they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are 
citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United 
States."). 
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zens who became U.S. citizens at the Founding, through birthright citizen-
ship or through naturalization. Taney asserted that black persons were not 
descended from the citizenship group, not surprisingly ignoring the special 
case of mixed-race people.2I Taney also noted that at least one state ap-
peared to reject birthright citizenship for black people.22 Lastly, Taney 
noted that naturalization had never been used to make black people citi-
zens.23 
Taney's discussion suggested more than that no black persons had 
been citizens at the time of the Founding through the 1850s. It suggested 
that black persons-whether free or enslaved-were incapable of becom-
ing citizens, a position not held with respect to other non-citizens. After 
discussing statutes from various colonies suggesting the degradation suf-
fered by black persons, Taney concluded not that the laws were unjust or 
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or general notions of liberty, but 
that the legal wall between black persons (including those of mixed race) 
and white persons was so high and thick that it made no sense to think that 
black persons were potential equals capable of citizenship at the time of the 
Founding.24 Indeed, Taney noted that Southern states never would have 
ratified the Constitution had they believed that black persons could be citi-
zens whose rights of citizenship would have to be protected as they trav-
eled from state to state.25 Taney appears to have been incorrect in 
21. But see id. at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("And as free colored persons were then citizens of at 
least five States, and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were among those 
for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and established."). 
22. See id. at 415 (opinion of the Court) (noting a New Hampshire law restricting the militia to 
free white persons and suggesting that even black people born in New Hampshire could not serve 
because they made up no part of the people and had no duty to defend the state). 
23. See id. at 418-20 (discussing the naturalization process and indicating that it had never cov-
ered black people). Of course, the naturalization power is left to Congress. See id. at 582 (Curtis, J., 
dissenting) ("The Constitution has left to the States the determination what persons, born within their 
respective limits, shall acquire by birth citizenship of the United States; it has not left to them any 
power to prescribe any rule for the removal of the disabilities of alienage. This power is exclusively in 
Congress."). 
24. See id. at 409 (opinion of the Court) ("[The laws cited] show that a perpetual and impassable 
barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slav-
ery, and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so 
far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or 
mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties, but 
in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the 
free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the 
whole race."). Although Taney also quotes statutes that would seem to put Indians in the same category 
of degradation, see id. at 413-14, he treats Indians as a separate class of people who are capable of 
citizenship. See id. at 403-04. 
25. However, some Southern states may not have been as hostile to the possibility of black citi-
zenship as Taney suggests. See id. at 573 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (discussing a North Carolina case 
indicating that free black persons could become citizens of North Carolina and vote in North Carolina 
before those rights were eventually eliminated by the North Carolina Constitution). 
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identifying a specific monolithic view of black persons at the time of the 
Founding. However, Taney's discussion of citizenship in general and black 
citizenship in particular relates to the Dred Scott Court's acceptance of 
tiered citizenship.26 
B. Tiered Citizenship 
Tiered citizenship results from the provision of different citizenship 
rights to different groups of citizens. Citizenship rights are those rights that 
are closely related to citizenship or are historically granted to citizens be-
cause of their status as citizens. Citizens who are provided all citizenship 
rights are treated as first-tier citizens. Citizens who are not provided all 
citizenship rights are treated as second-tier citizens or worse. Given that the 
Dred Scott Court declined to treat black persons as citizens at all, the issue 
of tiered citizenship does not flow directly from the Court's discussion of 
black citizenship. However, the Court's discussion of citizenship in the 
context of discussing black citizenship indicates that it embraced tiered 
citizenship. For example, the Court noted that women are citizens, but de-
fined citizenship rights and responsibilities in ways that allowed the possi-
bility of second-tier citizenship for women. 
Identifying rights of citizenship that are not being provided equally to 
all citizens is the first step in identifying tiered citizenship. The most sensi-
ble way to identify a citizenship right is to take the definition of a citizen 
and determine what rights have attached or should attach to that status. For 
example, in defining those to be considered citizens at the time of the 
Founding, Chief Justice Taney noted that citizens are part of the sovereign 
people and are the ultimate holders of power-exercised through represen-
tatives-in a republic. Given that vision of citizenship, voting should be 
considered a citizenship right and defending one's state or country should 
be considered a right or duty of a citizen.27 Indeed, both were analyzed as 
possible citizenship rights by the Court. However, voting and defending 
26. Eventually, the decision triggered a positive. See FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 4 ("Dred Scott 
came to symbolize the high point of racism in American law, but it also helped lead to the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been the fountainhead of racial equality in the twentieth cen-
tury."). 
27. Historically, some considered the right to hold office a citizenship right. See, e.g., 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 64-65 (counting eligibility to hold office as a right that sometimes 
went with the right to vote). However, some U.S. citizens are restricted from holding certain jobs, such 
as President of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 5 ("No person except a natural born 
Citizen ... shall be eligible to the Office of President .... "). Determining what rights are citizenship 
rights and what rights are super-citizenship rights can be difficult. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 48 (1998) (discussing rights historically held by all citizens 
and rights held by "first-class" citizens). 
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one's country were treated quite differently by the Dred Scott Court in the 
course of assessing the possibility of black citizenship. 
In discussing black citizenship, the Court noted that New Hampshire 
did not allow black men, even those born in New Hampshire, to join the 
militia. Given that defending one's state was considered a duty of the citi-
zen, that black men were not allowed to defend their state suggested to 
Taney that black persons were not considered citizens.28 However, New 
Hampshire treated white women citizens the same as black free men with 
respect to militia service during the post-Constitution, pre-Dred Scott era.29 
That would suggest that women were not considered citizens either, though 
the Dred Scott Court clearly noted that women were citizens.30 
Conversely, voting might appear to be even more tightly bound to 
citizenship than being a part of the militia given that the citizenry was sup-
posed to exercise its power through its elected representatives. However, 
although Taney recognized the power of voting, he did not deem it to be a 
right of citizenship to be exercised by all adult citizens.31 Certainly, many 
of that time conceived of the right to vote as a political right that could be 
rationed, not a right of citizenship that had to be provided. 32 Of course, 
Taney also had to deem the right to vote a non-citizenship right because the 
right to vote both was restricted to men and had been given to black per-
sons and other non-citizens in the country's history.33 Rather than treat 
28. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at415. 
29. See The Militia Law of the State of New Hampshire§ 4 (Peirce & Gardner 1808) ("And be it 
further enacted, That each and every free able bodied white male citizen of this State, resident therein, 
who is or shall be of the age of sixteen years, and under the age of forty years, (except such as are 
herein after excused,) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the Militia .... "). 
30. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422. 
31. See id. ("Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who 
form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power, and is incapacitated from 
holding particular offices. Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and 
when a property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the 
necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens."). Even Justice Curtis, in 
dissent, recognized that with respect to voting rights, some citizens could exercise the right and others 
could not. See id. at 581 (Curtis, J., dissenting)(" ... I do not think the enjoyment of the elective fran-
chise essential to citizenship, there can be no doubt it is one of the chiefest attributes of citizenship 
under the American Constitutions .... "). 
32. Even Justice Curtis treated it in this way. See id. at 583 ("One may confine the right of suf-
frage to white male citizens; another may extend it to colored persons and females; one may allow all 
persons above a prescribed age to convey property and transact business; another may exclude married 
women. But whether native-born women, or persons under age, or under guardianship because insane 
or spendthrifts, be excluded from voting or holding office, or allowed to do so, I apprehend no one will 
deny that they are citizens of the United States."). 
33. See id. at 416 (opinion of the Court) ("[I]n no part of the country except Maine, did the Afri-
can race, in point of fact, participate equally with the whites in the exercise of civil and political 
rights."). But see id. at 575 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (noting that the constitutions of various states indicate 
"that in some of the original thirteen States, free colored persons, before and at the time of the forma-
tion of the Constitution, were citizens of those States"). 
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voting as a citizenship right that had been unevenly granted, the Court de-
clined to treat it as a citizenship right. Therefore, proof that black persons 
had been given the right to vote in some states did not prove they were 
citizens or capable of citizenship.34 
The Dred Scott Court notwithstanding, voting is an exercise so tied to 
the notion of citizenship and belonging that it ought to have been deemed a 
citizenship right that had often been provided in a discriminatory fashion 
rather than a non-citizenship right. 35 The restrictions on the right to vote 
could be read, as Taney did, to suggest that the right to vote could not be a 
citizenship right precisely because it had been denied to groups of people 
who clearly were citizens.36 A different analysis would suggest that the 
right to vote was merely structured capriciously and treated improperly as a 
privilege to be extended to some citizens and some non-citizens. However, 
entrenchment of discrimination should not work a redefinition of a citizen-
ship right. That is, a citizenship right should not cease to be a citizenship 
right just because the government grants the right in a discriminatory fash-
ion. This would lead to the oddly circular argument that the rights of citi-
zenship are defined only as those given to all citizens by the government, 
meaning that the restriction of a right would end its status as a right of citi-
zenship. Based on this reasoning, it would be almost impossible to provide 
a citizenship right in a discriminatory manner, as the citizenship right 
would cease to be one once it was provided in a discriminatory manner.37 
Instead, it is more sensible to define what citizenship rights are in the ab-
stract, then ask whether they have been provided in a discriminatory fash-
ion. Citizens who are restricted from exercising rights of citizenship have 
been treated as second-tier citizens.38 
If voting is considered a citizenship right that has been provided in an 
uneven or discriminatory fashion, the Dred Scott Court's willingness to 
34. See id. at 422 (opinion of the Court) ("So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of 
the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union foreigners 
not naturalized are allowed to vote. And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but 
that does not make them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States. And the provision in the 
Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other States, does not apply to them."). But see id. at 
581 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (noting "the just and constitutional possession of this right [to vote] is deci-
sive evidence of citizenship"). 
35. The history of the United States is filled with restrictions on the right to vote, including prop-
erty qualifications, gender limitations, and racial restrictions. See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional 
Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. Ill, 123 (2003). 
36. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422. 
37. The one exception might be a situation where a citizenship right was explicitly defined as a 
citizenship right. The discriminatory provision of that right might not be deemed to change the charac-
ter of the right. 
38. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 48 (noting that "First-Class" citizens were considered able to 
exercise political rights such as voting). 
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allow second-tier citizenship becomes clear. With respect to women, voting 
was a citizenship right that was not extended to them. In addition, voting 
was a citizenship right that was extended to some non-citizens. Both facts 
strengthen the case that the Court, with all of its Justices, accepted tiered 
citizenship. Simply, the Dred Scott Court (taking the positions of all of the 
Justices into account) suggested the existence of four groups: citizens who 
could vote, citizens who could not vote, non-citizens who could vote, and 
non-citizens who could not vote. Given this landscape, those adult citizens 
who were not allowed to vote were a lesser form of citizen-a second-tier 
citizen. 
C. Personhood and Tiered Personhood 
Not surprisingly, in the context of Dred Scott, tiered personhood is a 
simpler issue to explain and understand than tiered citizenship. By positing 
black people as true outsiders who were incapable of being or becoming a 
part of the citizenry, the Dred Scott Court delineated a tier of personhood 
for black people that was well below that of other non-citizens. All black 
persons, whether free or enslaved, were considered inferior to everyone 
else and were subject to being given fewer rights than others.39 The Court's 
argument was simple and simplistic. Because African slaves had been 
treated as property when brought to the United States, the Negro race was a 
degraded one whose degradation was passed on to each of its members.40 
Given that supposed history, free black people were to be treated as free 
slaves rather than free people with slave ancestors. Indeed, Taney sug-
gested that free black people were regulated more like slaves than like 
other non-citizens.4I 
Rather than treat all non-citizens alike, the opinion considered other 
non-citizens living in the United States to be potential citizens-in-waiting 
or simply citizens of other nations.42 Particularly striking was how Taney 
compared the state of black people to that of Indians, another historically 
39. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05 ("[T]hey were at that time considered as a 
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as 
those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them."). 
40. See id. at 408 ("(A] negro of the African race was regarded by them as an article of property, 
and held, and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united in the Declara-
tion of Independence, and afterwards formed the Constitution of the United States. The slaves were 
more or less numerous in the different colonies, as slave labor was found more or less profitable. But no 
one seems to have doubted the correctness of the prevailing opinion of the time."). 
41. See id. at 421. 
42. This reminds one of the notion that all U.S. territories were thought to be states-in-waiting 
rather than permanent colonies or territories. See id. at 447. 
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disfavored group.43 Portrayed as noble savages, Indians were deemed a free 
people who could become United States citizens if they left their tribes, 
whereas black persons could never be citizens.44 Taney failed to explain 
fully why Indians were to be considered superior to black people given that 
some of the statutes he cited as treating free black persons as akin to slaves 
provided the same treatment for Indians.45 
That Taney's analysis was inconsistent is no surprise. However, it is 
secondary to the broader concern that the opinion accepted and perpetuated 
the notion of tiered personhood. Of that there is no doubt. The opinion 
quite clearly distinguished between the relative position of black persons to 
other non-citizens. Even casual observers of American history understand 
this, as possibly the most famous sentence from Dred Scott rather starkly 
illustrates the point: 
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an 
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either 
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might 
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.46 
That describes tiered personhood. The Reconstruction Amendments 
answered tiered personhood and tiered citizenship. 
II. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
The Reconstruction Amendments were a collective, if somewhat in-
complete, reply to the Dred Scott decision. The Thirteenth Amendment 
banned slavery.47 The Fourteenth Amendment made former slaves and 
their progeny citizens.48 The Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed that states 
43. I use the term Indian because the opinion uses it. As importantly, calling Indians "Native 
Americans" while discussing Dred Scott would be as ironic as calling black people "African Ameri-
cans" in the same context. 
44. Taney specifically distinguished Indians from black people, treating Indians as members of a 
different nation akin to non-citizen foreigners. See id. at 403--04. 
45. See. e.g., id. at 416 (citing law forbidding people from performing ceremonies intermarrying 
white persons with Indians, black persons, or mulattoes). 
46. /d. at 407. 
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). 
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). 
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could not provide the right to vote in a racially discriminatory manner.49 
Though each of the Reconstruction Amendments served a specific purpose, 
the amendments as a whole invited former (male) slaves and their progeny 
into the polity as full participants, and created both a single class of citizens 
and a single class of persons. 50 Though the Reconstruction Amendments 
primarily affect states, they remind both state and federal governments that 
government should treat all citizens equally with respect to certain rights 
and should treat all people equally with respect to certain rights. 
A. Thirteenth Amendment 
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and other forms of in-
voluntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, thus freeing former 
slaves. The freedom the Thirteenth Amendment provided arguably should 
have created a single class of citizens that included all those born in the 
United States, including former slaves.51 However, it did not, as freedom 
did not necessarily guarantee equal rights and equal treatment. That the 
Thirteenth Amendment did not make citizens out of former slaves was not 
surprising given that the Dred Scott decision had noted that free black peo-
ple were not citizens. Rather than grant citizenship to newly-freed former 
slaves, the Thirteenth Amendment arguably merely elevated former slaves 
to the level of free black persons.52 More would be required to provide 
citizenship and equality to former slaves and it came in the form of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 53 
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ I ('The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude."). 
50. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1400; Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Ziet-
low, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1398-99 (2005) ("The Reconstruction Era amendments ... were intended to constitutionalize the package of 
rights necessary to expand the national community to include formerly enslaved African Americans and 
facilitate their equal membership in that community."). 
51. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1401-04. 
52. See Garrett Epps, The Undiscovered Country: Northern Views of the Defeated South and the 
Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 411, 422 (2004) ("Southerners 'accepted' that Lincoln had freed the slaves-at least for the time being-but 
mere legal freedom did not make them citizens, it made them 'free blacks,' a tightly restricted legal 
status that had existed before the Civil War."). 
53. Of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an attempt to secure some of the rights the Thir-
teenth Amendment was to provide or protect by virtue of abolishing slavery, but which Southern states 
had declined to provide or affirmatively infringed. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 162. 
2007] DRED SCOTI: TIERED CITIZENSHIP AND TIERED PERSONHOOD 221 
B. Fourteenth Amendment 
In direct response to the Dred Scott decision, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provided citizenship to former slaves and their progeny.54 In addition 
to making former slaves citizens, the Amendment required that all citizens 
be provided citizenship rights on equal grounds. Though states were not 
allowed to pick and choose the citizens who would enjoy the rights of citi-
zenship, the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural equality provision did not 
dictate the substantive rights that states had to provide to citizens.55 Rather, 
it regulated how the rights that states granted to citizens were to be distrib-
uted. Nonetheless, the amendment implicitly created a single class of citi-
zen by demanding that whatever citizenship rights are provided to some 
citizens must be provided to all citizens. 
By declining to define or name any rights of citizenship, the Four-
teenth Amendment provided states with the latitude to continue to define 
important rights, such as voting, as something other than citizenship rights, 
i.e., rights that had to be provided equally to all citizens. Indeed, the Four-
teenth Amendment, as originally written, appeared to allow states to de-
cline to provide a right to vote to black male citizens on the basis of their 
race, if those states were willing to lose some proportional amount of con-
gressional representation. 56 Of course, if one presumed that no state was 
willing to pay for its voting restriction by losing congressional seats, the 
Fourteenth Amendment indirectly protected a right to vote. Nonetheless, 
how voting rights were treated illuminates the fact that, at the time of its 
passage, the Fourteenth Amendment demanded equality only with respect 
to a narrow set of rights defined as legal and civil rights, not wholesale 
equality with respect to social and political rights.57 This does not suggest 
that Dred Scott was anything other than odious, just that the Fourteenth 
54. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); AMAR, supra note 27, at 170-71. 
55. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1406 n.33. 
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State."). 
57. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36; Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, 
at 1416 & n.75. 
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Amendment imperfectly defined and protected some rights, such as voting 
rights, that should have been considered rights of citizenship. 58 
In addition to providing equal rights for citizens, the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided a basic level of rights to all persons, whether citizens 
or not, under the United States' jurisdiction. All persons were to enjoy due 
process rights with respect to their rights to life, liberty, and property, as 
well as equal protection rights. These protections created a single class of 
personhood with respect to a basic level of rights. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's explicit recognition that citizens must be treated as equals with re-
spect to citizenship rights and that persons must be treated as equals with 
respect to rights of personhood was an implicit rejection of the tiers of citi-
zenship and tiers of personhood that the Dred Scott Court accepted. 
C. Fifteenth Amendment 
The Fifteenth Amendment completed the task of formally integrating 
former male slaves into the polity by guaranteeing that the right to vote 
would not be abridged on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. The Fifteenth Amendment provided protection for the right to 
vote that buttressed the protection the Fourteenth Amendment provided 
indirectly. However, that protection was provided in a procedural manner 
reminiscent of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of rights. Rather 
than provide the right to vote, the Fifteenth Amendment required that 
whatever right to vote the state grants must be provided in a racially non-
discriminatory manner.59 This distinction between providing a right to vote 
and protecting voting from discriminatory distribution arguably no longer 
matters as the Fourteenth Amendment now treats voting essentially as a 
fundamental right.60 However, at the time, the Fifteenth Amendment pro-
tected the right to vote of former slaves as powerfully as could be expected 
and indicated a desire to treat former slaves as full members of society. In 
addition, it suggested that the right to vote was tied more closely to citizen-
ship than the Dred Scott decision suggested. 
58. The Fourteenth Amendment's treatment of voting suggests the dual nature of the right to vote 
as both a political and citizenship right. How voting was addressed arguably suggests that voting was 
not a citizenship right covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the fact that voting was spe-
cifically mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that voting is intimately related to citizen-
ship or representation, the means through which Chief Justice Taney suggested that citizens exercised 
power in a republic. 
59. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1419 ("To be clear, the Fifteenth Amendment 
does not provide the right to vote; it limits how the right to vote generally provided by the state gov-
ernment may be restricted." (footnotes omitted)). 
60. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964). 
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D. Government Prerogative 
The Reconstruction Amendments provide a different way of structur-
ing governmental prerogative. Rather than accept governmental prerogative 
that allows governments to choose favorites among groups of citizens or 
groups of people, thereby creating tiers of citizenship and tiers of person-
hood, the Reconstruction Amendments demand equality with respect to 
rights. Certainly, occasions may arise when citizens have not yet gained 
some rights of citizenship or when they lose some rights of citizenship. 
However, the differential provision of rights must be based on some justifi-
cation, not governmental fiat that categorizes certain groups of citizens as 
second-tier citizens and categorizes groups of persons as unworthy of the 
most basic rights of personhood. 
III. TIERS AND JUSTIFIED RIGHTS RESTRICTION 
The Reconstruction Amendments write equality into the fabric of the 
Constitution and eliminate tiered citizenship and tiered personhood by re-
quiring the provision of equal rights under most circumstances. However, 
tiered citizenship or tiered personhood does not result every time a right is 
withheld or affirmatively taken away from certain citizens, persons, or 
groups of citizens or persons. Citizenship rights and personhood rights may 
be restricted or taken away from citizens and people consistent with the 
spirit of a single tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood when the 
restriction of the right is actually justified. Conversely, if the restriction of 
the right is merely explained, but not actually justified, a de facto tier may 
have been created. 
A. JustifYing the Restriction of Rights 
Though rights are supposed to be enjoyed by all under most circum-
stances, they must be restricted on some occasions. A justified restriction of 
rights does not create the specter of tiering; an unjustified restriction of 
rights does create the specter of tiering. Though determining whether a 
restriction of rights is justified is difficult, justifying a restriction of rights is 
critically important in determining whether the restriction represents a prin-
cipled limitation on the exercise of rights or merely reflects a government's 
choice to favor or disfavor a citizen vis-a-vis other citizens. This essay will 
not attempt to assess whether any particular restriction of rights is or is not 
justified. Rather, it merely highlights the need to justify restrictions on 
rights lest those restrictions appear to flow from a Dred Scott mindset that 
embraces unjustified differential treatment. 
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Justifying a restriction of rights is a two-step process. The first step 
requires determining why the right at issue exists. For example, in deter-
mining whether a restriction of a state-based right to bear arms is justified, 
one would need to determine precisely why the right to bear arms was pro-
vided by the state. 61 The difficulty in· determining the answer comes from 
the need to answer the question in the abstract, without reference to how 
the right has been shaped by the very limitation one seeks to justify. That 
is, if one defines the scope of the right to bear arms solely based on the 
manner in which the right has been restricted, the restriction becomes a 
description of the contours of the right rather than a justification for the 
restriction of the right. 
The second step requires comparing the basis for the restriction to the 
purpose of the right restricted. Relevant questions include the following: Is 
this restriction of the right necessary to preserve the value of the right for 
others? Would continued use of the right by the restricted person harm the 
exercise of the right by all others? Has the restricted person demonstrated 
an inability to use the restricted right properly? These questions help de-
termine whether there is a relationship between the basis of the restriction 
and the right itself. If there is little or no relationship between the right's 
utilization and the restriction of the right, the restriction may be an exercise 
of the raw power to restrict rights rather than a justification for the restric-
tion of the right. 
The analysis must occur against the backdrop of the fact that the right 
in question is generally given to all citizens or all people. Consequently, the 
right should or must be provided unless there is a true justification for re-
stricting it. Some might suggest that justification is merely a substitute for 
strict scrutiny; it is not.62 Certainly, the concepts are related, but the tiers of 
scrutiny in constitutional law are structured differently. This is not surpris-
ing, as the tiers of scrutiny aim to determine whether a law or action is 
constitutional. Consequently, the tiers of scrutiny merely require that 
governmental restrictions that appear more troubling under the Constitution 
be more convincingly explained than governmental restrictions that appear 
less troubling under the Constitution.63 Conversely, the concept ofjustifica-
61. This question is difficult enough to answer at the federal level. Scholars have been debating 
the issue for years. See Symposium, The Second Amendement: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. I (2000). Answering the question at the state level may be even more difficult depending on the process 
by which the right was generated at the state level. 
62. See Chambers, Retooling, supra note 4, at 613 (noting the content of the strict scrutiny test). 
63. See id. at 612-13 & nn.7-14 (noting that the strength of the explanation necessary to deem a 
governmental action constitutional is lowest under the rational basis test applied to state action with 
modest equal protection implications, and highest under the strict scrutiny test applied to state action 
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tion suggested in this essay is structured on determining whether there is a 
real relationship between the restriction and the right itself. The concept of 
justification aims to determine if citizens are being treated as second-tier 
citizens as a way to identify Dred Scott-style thinking. The question re-
mains, have tiered citizenship and tiered personhood been successfully 
abolished by the Reconstruction Amendments? 
B. Tiered Citizenship and Felon Disfranchisement 
Tiered citizenship entails the denial of a right of citizenship to a citi-
zen or some group of citizens without justification. Regardless of how it 
may have been viewed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, vot-
ing is now considered a fundamental right of citizenship, the abridgment of 
which must withstand exacting scrutiny.64 If the denial of the right to vote 
is actually justified, such denial does not trigger concerns of second-tier 
citizenship whether its denial passes the required constitutional scrutiny or 
not. Conversely, if the denial of rights is not actually justified, it triggers 
second-tier citizenship concerns whether it passes the required constitu-
tional scrutiny or not. Just such an issue arises with felon disfranchisement. 
Felon disfranchisement may take a number of forms, but eventually 
yields a felon-citizen who cannot vote. Felon disfranchisement has not 
always been strict and arguably did not flower fully until after the Recon-
struction Amendments required that black men be provided the right to 
vote. 65 Consequently, felon disfranchisement has been more of a process of 
picking and choosing ways to restrict voting rights rather than a universal 
command suggesting that felonious behavior should always trigger the loss 
of the franchise.66 This should trigger tiered citizenship concerns. In deter-
mining whether felon disfranchisement is justified, the question becomes, 
is a restriction on the right to vote related to a prior felony conviction? 
with crucial equal protection implications, such as those creating racial classifications or affecting 
fundamental rights). 
64. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,337 (1972). 
65. Indeed, some of the disfranchisement laws of the post-Reconstruction era were aimed specifi-
cally at disfranchising black citizens. See Gabriel J. Chin, The "Voting Rights Act of 1867": The Consti-
tutionality of Federal Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1608 
(2004); see also Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation and the "Men-
ace of Negro Domination": Racial Threat and Felon Disfranchisement in the United States, 1850-
2002, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559 (2003) (discussing links between racial composition of prison populations 
and adoption of felon disfranchisement laws). 
66. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the 
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 305 (2004) 
(discussing Mississippi's choice of crimes to which felon disfranchisement would apply based on 
beliefs regarding the characteristics of crimes that black people would commit). 
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One claimed justification for restricting felon voting rights has been 
that such restrictions have always been allowed and still appear to be al-
lowed under the Fourteenth Amendment,67 At least two responses exist. 
First, though the Fourteenth Amendment appears to contemplate or allow 
felon disfranchisement, it may do so based on the belief prevailing at the 
time of the amendment's passage that voting was not a fundamental right. 
Now that voting is treated as a fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment arguably protects the distribution of the right to all citizens.68 Second, 
that felon disfranchisement may be facially constitutional does not actually 
justify the practice. If the practice is not consistent with democracy and the 
notion of a single tier of citizenship, it is problematic. The text of the Con-
stitution arguably afforded the Dred Scott majority the latitude to write the 
opinion it wrote. However, the substance of the opinion still created a 
tiered citizenship. Indeed, the Dred Scott Court made clear that the Consti-
tution allowed the tiered citizenship of women. 69 The allowance of a sec-
ond tier of citizenship hardly made such treatment appropriate, it just made 
it constitutional at the time. Of course, the second tier of citizenship for 
women was not justified; it was simply explained, asserted, and allowed. 
Allowing felon disfranchisement to be merely explained, asserted, and 
allowed would likewise be problematic. 
Felon disfranchisement is practiced differently throughout the United 
States with some states having an almost total ban on voting by those who 
have been convicted of certain felonies, others allowing felons to vote after 
they have completed various parts of their sentences, and yet others having 
no felony-based restrictions at all. 70 That states apply a patchwork of felon 
disfranchisement laws does not necessarily mean that felon disfranchise-
ment is not justified or justifiableJI However, it suggests that different 
67. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 
1436 n.l63. 
68. See Chambers, Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 1425 n.ll6. 
69. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,422 (1857). 
70. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (providing state-by-state felon 
disfranchisement laws); Right to Vote: Campaign to End Felony Disfranchisement, 
http://www.righttovote.org/state.asp (last visited Sep. 7, 2006) (same). Of course, disfranchisement has 
been a punishment for bad behavior, such as taking up arms against one's country. However, voting 
rights were restored to most Confederates fairly soon after the Civil War. See General Amnesty Act, ch. 
193, 17 Stat. 142 (1872); Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1104-05. 
71. However, wide differences in the severity of felon disfranchisement laws suggest that continu-
ing to disfranchise felons after they are no longer under the supervision of the criminal justice system 
does not reflect a nationwide consensus. The lack of consensus on whether the right to vote must be 
denied to felons suggests that there may not be a justification for the lifetime bans on felon voting that 
some states have. Indeed, many scholars have questioned the justifications generally provided for felon 
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states may have quite different reasons for their felon disfranchisement 
laws. Some of those reasons may be true justifications while others may 
merely be explanations for treating felons poorly. For example, a state that 
views the right to vote as a core citizenship right but which bans felons 
from voting because the state believes that withholding a core right is fair 
punishment for a felony may have an explanation for their felon disfran-
chisement law, but may not have a justification for it. 
However, the power to restrict felons in some ways does not auto-
matically justify the restriction of felons with respect to citizenship rights. 
A justification would come in the form of an argument that the felony con-
viction that triggered the disfranchisement suggests that the felon should 
not be allowed to exercise the franchise in order to protect the right to vote 
for those who can properly exercise it. If felon disfranchisement is fully 
justified in all states that practice it in whatever form the states practice it, 
concerns regarding tiered citizenship vanish. However, in the absence of a 
justification for felon disfranchisement, the restriction of voting rights sim-
ply helps to create a second-tier citizenship for felons. Some may desire 
just such a second-tier citizenship for felons. However, this recalls the 
thinking underlying Dred Scott. 
C. Tiered Personhood and War on Terror Detainees 
The tiered personhood issue has two components. The first component 
focuses on guaranteeing that all persons are given the same set of rights 
that other persons receive. The second component focuses on ensuring that 
no set of persons is given a set of rights below the minimum rights guaran-
teed to all persons in all circumstances.72 Our country's commitment to 
both of these principles is being tested with respect to how we treat detain-
ees in the War on Terror (WOT).73 Two questions arise. First, under what 
circumstances are WOT detainees being given fewer rights than non-WOT 
disfranchisement. See KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 41--45 (2005) (discussing scholarly critique of felony disfranchisement). See generally JEFF MANZA & 
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); Ewald, supra note 70. 
72. Certainly, actions, such as criminal action, can trigger the loss of rights. However, all elements 
of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Nonetheless, once the proof has been provided, the loss of liberty or life can occur. See Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (discussing the application of the death penalty, but not questioning its 
general legality). 
73. Of course, War on Terror detainees are not the only non-citizens who may have to worry 
about second-tier personhood in the post-9/11 world. See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, 
"Aliens" in Our Midst Post-9111: Legislating Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1683 (2005) (book review). 
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detainees? Second, under what circumstances, if any, are WOT detainees 
being provided fewer rights than all persons are to be provided under the 
Constitution under all circumstances? Depending on the answers to these 
questions, the government may be in the process of creating a different tier 
of personhood for WOT detainees. 
The question regarding second-tier personhood must be asked in part 
because it appears that WOT detainees are provided fewer rights than non-
WOT detainees.74 For example, WOT detainees appear to receive less ac-
cess to counsel and the courts than other detainees receive.75 Similarly, 
WOT detainees appear to receive harsher physical treatment than other 
detainees receive.76 In addition, WOT detainees appear to have been sub-
ject to the possibility of extraordinary rendition-a practice in which the 
U.S. delivers a detainee to another country that has fewer concerns about 
using certain particularly stressful interrogation techniques than the U.S. 
does-whereas other detainees are not. 77 If there is legitimate justification 
for this differential treatment, there is no second-tier personhood problem; 
if there is no legitimate justification for such treatment, the WOT detainees 
arguably are being treated as second-tier persons. 
The implications flowing from the treatment of WOT detainees is par-
ticularly interesting in that the law relating to that issue is somewhat in 
flux.78 Certainly, some of the laws and practices that govern detainee 
74. See Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (reporting on interrogation 
techniques that had been authorized specifically for War on Terror detainees). 
75. Congress has stripped statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction from the federal courts in many 
War on Terror detainee cases. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e), 28 U.S.C.A. § 224l(e) · 
(West Supp. 2006); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA & KENNETH THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT II (2005), available at 
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts!RL33180_20051207.pdf; Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The 
Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 748-52 (2006) (discussing the 
stripping of habeas corpus jurisdiction under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005). 
76. Claims of torture or other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of War on Terror detainees 
exist. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 75, at 696; Mayer, supra note 74, at 34, 37 (discussing brutal 
treatment of detainee Mohammed al-Qahtani). The recently passed Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
outlaws cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of persons under custody or control of the United States 
government and defines such treatment to include any treatment barred by the Fifth, Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. See Detainee Treatment Act of2005 § 1003,42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000dd (West Supp. 2006). What effect it may have is unclear. 
77. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing the case of a Cana-
dian-Syrian citizen who was rendered through Jordan to Syria, where he was tortured); Chesney, supra 
note 75, at 665-69 (discussing rendition and the law of detainee transfer when there is risk of torture 
from receiving country). 
78. This is not to say that there are no laws on the issue, just that what law the United States will 
follow when analyzing specific questions regarding the treatment of WOT detainees is somewhat 
unclear. Unfortunately, even the Government's most recent attempt to clarify issues, The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. I 09-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 
I 0 U.S.C.), may fail to do so. 
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treatment may allow WOT detainees to be treated differently than other 
detainees of the U.S. government, such as unremarkable violators of federal 
law. Differential treatment that comports with the law obviously would be 
legal. However, the differential treatment, even if it comports with the law, 
must be justified if it is to avoid the creation of second-tier personhood. 
Without justification, those laws are simply the vehicles used to treat WOT 
detainees as second-tier persons. Indeed, vigilance may be particularly 
necessary in areas where the relevant written law allows for differential 
treatment. The existence of statutes allowing differential treatment may 
cause many to be complacent about the possibility of seemingly legal, sec-
ond-tier treatment. In addition, vigilance may be particularly necessary in 
circumstances where some forms of differential treatment may have little, 
if any, opportunity to be addressed through the courts.79 
However, most important in considering the treatment of WOT de-
tainees may be the fact that President George W. Bush has suggested that 
he may exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers independent of the writ-
ten law. 80 Asserting this power literally gives the President the power to 
pick and choose who will be treated poorly and who will be treated well. 
With this power comes the obligation to justify the choices, at least in a 
broad sense. Given the possibility of the use of presidential fiat, it is par-
ticularly important to develop and consider possible justifications that 
could support allowing the President to provide fewer rights or poorer 
treatment to WOT detainees than to other detainees in U.S. custody. This is 
not an argument against the exercise of extraordinary Commander-in-Chief 
powers. It is a recognition that even if the Commander-in-Chief's power in 
fact supersedes the written law in certain circumstances, not only must the 
required circumstances that would trigger the use of the extraordinary 
power actually exist, but the exercise of the power still should be analyzed 
to determine if it would create second-tier personhood for the WOT detain-
79. See Josh White & Carol D. Leonnig, U.S. Cites Exception in Torture Ban, WASH. POST, Mar. 
3, 2006, at A4 (noting that the Bush administration has argued that "the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, removes general access to U.S. courts for all Guantanamo Bay captives"). Even after the passage 
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, it is unclear precisely how much practical access the WOT 
detainees will have to federal courts. 
80. See George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 
2006, 41 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1918, 1919 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html ("The executive branch shall 
construe Title X in Division A of the Act [also called the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005], relating to 
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the 
unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations 
on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the Presi-
dent, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks."). 
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ees. The justification for whatever treatment a President may allow would 
determine whether the treatment created a second tier of personhood for 
any particular WOT detainee or WOT detainees as a class. 
For example, assume that the United States government contemplated 
engaging in the practice of extraordinary rendition. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, the procedure may be legal under our written law, or, even if it 
is not explicitly legal, it may be acceptable under law if the President is 
legally allowed to exercise the Commander-in-Chief powers he claims to 
possess. 81 Certainly, the law itself and the President will rely on reasons for 
allowing or ordering the extraordinary rendition. However, the issue is 
whether the reason is merely an explanation for the extraordinary rendition 
or an actual justification. An actual justification for the rendition decision 
might make the decision an appropriate one under Reconstruction Amend-
ments (specifically Fourteenth Amendment) principles; a mere explanation 
for the decision would make the decision an acceptable one under Dred 
Scott's principles. 
A recitation of reasons does not equal justification. The Dred Scott 
Court merely recited the facts that free black persons and slaves were 
treated badly under the laws of various states and allowed the inhuman 
treatment of slaves and free black persons to continue, making them sec-
ond-tier persons. The Court's allowance of such poor treatment did not 
justify it; the allowance merely made it constitutional at the time. Detainees 
in the WOT may deserve different treatment that non-WOT detainees and 
may deserve treatment previously thought to be less generous than all per-
sons deserve. As long as such treatment is actually justified, it does not 
trigger second-tier personhood concerns. With justification, the treatment 
becomes a legitimate manner of distinguishing those who can be treated 
particularly harshly because of what they have done from those who cannot 
be treated so harshly. Without justification, the treatment is the mechanism 
for removing the personhood status of the WOT detainees. If that is what is 
to be done, it should be done in clear recognition that similar treatment has 
been allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court, but has been rejected by the peo-
ple through the spirit of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
81. Some believe that the Commander-in-Chief powers are quite broad. See Daniel Levin, Acting 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Memorandum for James B. Corney, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (superseding previous August I, 2002 memo 
opining on very broad Commander-in-Chief power, but not contradicting the analysis on that issue); Jay 
S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 
(Aug. I, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ dojinterroga-
tionmemo2002080 !.pdf (arguing for extremely broad vision of Commander-in-Chief power). 
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As with the discussion of felon disfranchisement, the point of this es-
say is not to argue for or against the existence of a justification or lack 
thereof for the treatment of War on Terror detainees. The point is to pro-
vide the ground rules for the discussion of whether restrictions on person-
hood rights are justified or unjustified for purposes of deciding whether 
multiple tiers of personhood or citizenship have been created. Indeed, if 
this essay spurs people merely to think about the notion and necessity of 
justifying governmental action as required by fealty to the spirit of the Re-
construction Amendments, it will have served an important purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The Dred Scott Court allowed tiers of citizenship and tiers of person-
hood to exist, with various groups of citizens favored over others and vari-
ous groups of persons favored over others. Simply, that Court allowed 
governments to pick and choose who was allowed to exercise citizenship 
rights and rights of personhood with little or any justification for the 
choices.82 Some may argue that Dred Scott was a sign of the times, and 
indeed it was. In response, the Reconstruction Amendments were passed to 
write into the law a single tier of citizenship and a single tier of person-
hood. Nonetheless, the danger of creating tiers of citizenship and tiers of 
personhood is ever present. 
Concerns about tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood do not 
mean that individual citizens and persons, or even groups of them, will 
never forfeit rights. Certainly, there are and will be occasions when specific 
citizens or groups of citizens will lose some rights of citizenship without 
tiers of citizenship being created, and some persons or groups of persons 
will lose some rights generally enjoyed by all persons without tiers of per-
sonhood being created. However, why the citizen is denied the citizenship 
right or why the person is denied the personhood right is critical. If the 
denial of rights is actually justified, the denial does not create second-tier 
citizenship or personhood, but instead creates a legitimate limitation on the 
exercise of the citizenship or personhood right. However, the mere adher-
82. This is not to say that the Dred Scott Court gave governments complete discretion to select 
winners and losers. Chief Justice Taney vigorously protected the rights of some citizens against gov-
ernment intrusion using the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) ("Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, 
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of Con-
gress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came 
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed 
no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law."). 
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ence to written law in taking such rights does not indicate adequate justifi-
cation, as the written law itself may not provide actual justification for the 
denial of rights. If the denial of the right is not actually justified, the reason 
given for the denial is merely an explanation or excuse to deny a right of 
citizenship to a citizen or a right of personhood to a person. An unjustified 
denial of such rights can create tiers of citizenship and personhood. 
It would be easy to argue that we are in a post-Dred Scott world in 
which tiers of citizenship and tiers of personhood have been abolished. 
Though we are in a post-Dred Scott world, we must always be vigilant that 
we think with a post-Dred Scott mindset. Dred Scott afforded and blessed a 
world in which different sets of citizens were provided different sets of 
rights for no good reason, and different groups of people were provided 
different sets of rights for no good reason. The temptation to follow the 
same path exists today, even in our post-Dred Scott world. Rather than 
adhere to the requirement that a single class of citizen be allowed to exer-
cise all rights of citizenship and that a single class of person be treated with 
basic dignity, governments may explain differential treatment of groups of 
citizens or persons with rationalizations rather than real justifications for 
such treatment. Vigilance and reason are necessary to ensure that the temp-
tation to treat groups of people in unjustifiable manners does not over-
whelm us and the constitutional amendments our country put in place to 
squelch such temptation. It will take continued vigilance to keep Dred 
Scott-era thinking out of our post-Dred Scott world.83 
83. A commitment to an inclusive America may require rethinking the basket of rights that all 
Americans and all persons in the United States are supposed to share. See generally Morgan & Zietlow, 
supra note 50. 
